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JURISDICTION, MERITS, AND PROCEDURE: 
THOUGHTS ON DODSON’S TRICHOTOMY 
Howard M. Wasserman* 
In his outstanding article, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction,1 Profes-
sor Scott Dodson delineates the appropriate boundaries between rules of 
subject matter jurisdiction and rules of judicial procedure in the context of 
removal time limits, and argues that we must develop a “broader under-
standing of the interrelationship and boundaries among the trichotomy of 
jurisdiction, procedure, and merits.”2  He also suggests that the strands of 
each pair in the triangle interact in distinct ways and require distinct rules 
for separating one from the other.3  Having sought in recent work to define, 
clearly and cleanly, boundaries between subject matter jurisdiction and the 
substantive merits of federal claims of right,4 I agree as to b
This Essay constitutes an initial move towards that understanding.  It 
examines each pair in the conceptual trichotomy, considering the connec-
tions at each point in the triangle, when those connections come into play, 
and how and why to disentangle each pair. 
I. JURISDICTION AND MERITS 
The easiest pair to disentangle should be subject matter jurisdiction and 
substantive merits of federal claims of right.  Although jurisdiction has been 
called a word of “many, too many, meanings,”5 it can broadly be defined as 
the court’s raw, baseline power and legitimate authority to hear and resolve 
the legal and factual issues in a class of cases.6  Merits, by contrast, are de-
 
*  Visiting Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; Associate Professor, FIU 
College of Law. 
1  102 NW. U. L. REV. 55 (2008).  
2  Id. at 89. 
3  Id. at 89–90.  
4  See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-Extant Rights, 56 KANSAS L. REV. 227 
(2008) [hereinafter Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights]; Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and 
Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. REV. 579 (2007) [hereinafter Wasserman, Substantiality]; Howard M. 
Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643 (2005) [hereinafter Wasserman, Jurisdic-
tion]. 
5  Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (link) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)). 
6  Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 22 (1994); 
Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1620 (2003); Wasserman, 
Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 650. 
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fined by who can sue whom, what real-world conduct can provide basis for 
a suit, and the legal consequences of a defendant’s failure to conform that 
conduct to its legal duties.7  The consequence of the jurisdictional label 
most frequently sounds in practical effects: jurisdictional issues are not sub-
ject to waiver by parties; the court bears an independent obligation to inves-
tigate and raise jurisdictional problems; and the court resolves any factual 
issues on which jurisdiction turns.8 On the other hand, merits issues should 
be resolved at trial, typically with a jury serving as finder of any contested 
facts.9  Most dramatically, courts tend, properly or otherwise, to construe 
jurisdictional rules “rigidly, literally, and mercilessly,”10 in a way they do 
not with merits rules. 
My basic argument has been that there should be no overlap in the 
definitions between jurisdiction and merits because statutory grants of fed-
eral jurisdiction focus on non-substantive questions, distinct from the 
source of the substantive right sued upon.11  Jurisdictional rules ordinarily 
inquire about either the identity of the parties or the source of the legal right 
or liberty asserted;12 neither inquiry depends on the success of the substan-
tive claim asserted.13  The Supreme Court recently recognized this in Ar-
baugh v. Y&H Corp., holding that an element of the plaintiff’s federal claim 
of right does not affect the court’s jurisdiction; the plaintiff’s success or 
failure in pleading and proving an element determines only whether the 
plaintiff prevails on the merits.14  Arbaugh commands, and I have argued, 
that courts should consider a provision of positive law as jurisdictional only 
when its plain language is addressed to the court and speaks in terms of ju-
dicial power about the class of cases that courts can hear and resolve.15 
Neither Congress nor the Court has maintained a sufficiently sharp dis-
tinction between jurisdiction and merits, and, unfortunately, Arbaugh did 
not resolve the matter with finality.  Most problematically, Arbaugh kept 
alive the questionable doctrine of Bell v. Hood, under which a court lacks 
jurisdiction where a federal claim is insubstantial or wholly frivolous.16  I 
 
7  John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.  
2513, 2515 (1998); Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 4, at 236. 
8  Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; but see Perry Dane, Sad Time: Thoughts on Jurisdictionality, The Legal 
Imagination, and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164, 166 (2008), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2008/2/ (link) (“[J]urisdictionality is more than 
just a label for certain consequences.”). 
9  Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 663–64. 
10  Dane, supra note 6, at 5. 
11  Id. at 44. 
12  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (link); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337, 1346 (2000) (link). 
13  Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 671–72. 
14  546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006). 
15  Id. at 526; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 693–94. 
16  Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006) (citing Bell v. Hood, 376 U.S. 678 
(1946)). 
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criticize this failure elsewhere, arguing that Bell serves no purpose other 
than to create confusion and uncertainty in the jurisdiction/merits corner.17 
Arbaugh also permitted Congress to define jurisdiction in terms of sub-
stantive merits—so long as it is clear in doing so.18 The court’s authority to 
resolve legal and factual issues going to a claim of right should not hinge on 
the ultimate, or even potential, success of that claim of right.  Otherwise, 
there is no rational way for Congress and the courts, in writing and inter-
preting jurisdictional grants, to decide when to overlap and when not to.  If 
the issues can overlap, then every dismissal or rejection of a claim poten-
tially becomes a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and no claim ever can be 
said to be defeated on the merits.19  Alternatively, if only some jurisdic-
tional grants are bound up with merits, there is no explanation or justifica-
tion for why some merits issues should be jurisdictional and others not. 
Courts thus continue to wrestle with statutory text and congressional 
intent at the sign of any apparent jurisdiction/merits overlap.  This wrestling 
frequently occurs with respect to federal sovereign immunity, where Con-
gress consents to suit for certain claims under certain conditions and grants 
federal jurisdiction to hear those suits.20  But if the conditions for the waiver 
of sovereign immunity are not met, does the court lack jurisdiction over the 
action?  Or does the plaintiff’s claim against the government fail on the 
merits because the government is not subject to a judicially remediable sub-
stantive legal duty? 
This divide formed the core of John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 
States.21  Under the Tucker Act, the United States can be sued for monetary 
claims—sounding in the Constitution, federal law, contract, quasi-contract, 
or non-tort liquidated damages—with exclusive jurisdiction vested in the 
United States Court of Claims.22  A separate provision imposes a six-year 
statute of limitations for commencing actions in that court.23  Statutes of 
limitations ordinarily are characterized as substantive; they are an affirma-
tive defense to the merits of the claim.24  But the claim of right against the 
United States exists only because Congress waived sovereign immunity; 
thus, the argument goes, the waiver was valid only under certain conditions, 
one of which was timely commencement of the action.25  In short, the Court 
 
17  Wasserman, Substantiality, supra note 4, at 582–84. 
18  Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514–15. 
19  Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 672. 
20  Dane, supra note 6, at 45 & n.128. 
21  John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S, No. 06-1164 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2008), 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1164.pdf (link), aff’g 457 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (en banc). 
22  28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000) (link). 
23  28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000) (link). 
24  See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1159–60 
(1982); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
25  John R. Sand & Gravel, 457 F.3d at 1354–55. 
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of Claims had jurisdiction over any claims in which sovereign immunity 
was waived, and sovereign immunity was waived only if the claim was 
timely filed.  For the Federal Circuit, this rendered the statute of limitations 
jurisdictional and, for purposes of that case, not subject to waiver by the 
parties. 
Viewing the limitations period as jurisdictional overlooks two discrete 
concerns.  The first is the text of § 2501. Properly read, it addresses the time 
for bringing claims and not the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.  Section 
2501 speaks of “every claim of which the United States Court of Federal 
Claims has jurisdiction,” but that language is not addressed to the court; 
rather, it is addressed to the parties contemplating such cases.  Since the ju-
risdiction of the Court of Claims extends no further than claims for mone-
tary recovery against the United States, the quoted language means “every 
claim against the United States”; so understood, § 2501 is more clearly 
grounded in a merits determination of who can be sued for some conduct. 
Second, on close examination, sovereign immunity makes better sense 
as a merits issue.  By subjecting the United States to suit, Congress identi-
fies an appropriate and available defendant in an action—itself.  The United 
States places itself under a legal duty to adhere to substantive rules in its 
contracting and business conduct and attaches a judicially enforceable legal 
consequence—monetary liability—to its failure to adhere to its duties.  Ab-
sent the waiver of sovereign immunity, no claim would lie against the 
United States because there would be no enforceable duty on the United 
States to behave in a particular way and no right to legal remedy from the 
United States.  This is the essence of merits analysis—who can be sued for 
what conduct to recover what remedy.26 
The “immunity” label and its treatment as a threshold litigation issue 
do not change that character.  For example, government-official immunities 
(for example, absolute judicial immunity from constitutional claims) also 
are threshold defenses providing protection from suit (not merely liability), 
but courts nevertheless treat them as defenses to the merits.27  Similarly, the 
Court of Claims remains open and empowered to hear claims against the 
United States; the different question is whether the conditions for waiver of 
immunity can be established in a given plaintiff’s case. 
The actual jurisdictional grant for the Court of Claims in § 1491(a)(1) 
identifies the appropriate forum for any lawsuit against the United States for 
the claims identified.  That provision functions as a party-based jurisdic-
tional grant, under which federal judicial power over an action turns on the 
 
26  But see United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (link) (“[T]he existence of consent is 
a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”). 
27  See, e.g., Rogers v. Montgomery, No. 4:07-1512-MBS, 2007 WL2152896, at *3 (D.S.C. July 25, 
2007). 
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identity of the parties.28  Compare this with basic diversity jurisdiction, un-
der which federal district courts attain jurisdiction based on the citizenship 
of the parties.29 The diversity statute disconnects jurisdiction and the sub-
stantive merits of the underlying claim.30  Where the named defendant in a 
diversity action is not the proper or appropriate party because the conditions 
for its liability under substantive law have not been met, the plaintiff’s case 
is lost on the merits, not for want of diversity jurisdiction.  Section 
1491(a)(1) should be understood in the same way.  When the United States 
is not a proper defendant because the conditions for it to be sued and sub-
ject to liability on a contract or other monetary claim—such as the timeli-
ness of the lawsuit—have not been met, the case against the United States is 
lost on the merits.  The Court of Claims never loses its adjudicative juris-
diction—it simply has no valid claim to adjudicate against a potentially li-
able defendant. 
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed in John R. Sand, holding that 
the lower court was required to raise the limitations issue sua sponte and 
there was no waiver of the issue. Importantly, however, the Court seemed to 
purposefully avoid expanding the concept of jurisdiction.  The Court never 
described the limitations period as jurisdictional, instead labeling it a “more 
absolute[] kind of limitations period.”31  In other words, § 2501 retains 
unique rigid characteristics akin to jurisdictional rules, but is not necessarily 
an actual jurisdictional rule because it is not tied to the court’s raw struc-
tural authority to hear and resolve legal and factual issues in the case.  The 
Court essentially disaggregated one prime consequence of jurisdictional-
ity—non-waivability—from the jurisdictional label and read § 2501 as at-
taching those consequences to a non-jurisdictional, thus merits-related, 
limitations period.32  Merits-based affirmative defenses ordinarily are sub-
ject to party waiver, but that need not be so.  As the master of the scope and 
nature of the rights existing as federal substantive law, Congress could cre-
ate a uniquely absolute, mandatory statute of limitations that nevertheless 
remains substantive-merits-based. It need only make clear the mandatory 
nature of the particular limitations defense. 
Evan Tsen Lee argues that there is no hard conceptual difference be-
tween jurisdiction and merits, and that nothing categorically separates juris-
diction questions from merits questions other than legislative say-so.  Thus, 
 
28  Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
1499, 1508 (1990); Edward Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions 
Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 
2250 n.57 (1999). 
29  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (link). 
30  Lee, supra note 6, at 1626; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 701. 
31  John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S, No. 06-1164, slip op. at 3 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2008). 
32  The Court actually undertook no new statutory analysis to get to this point, instead basing its de-
cision largely on statutory stare decisis. Id. slip op. at 8. 
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nothing prevents the legislature from tying jurisdiction to the equities.33  
But, simply because Congress can define jurisdiction in merits terms does 
not mean it should.  Any overlap is “awkward for legal doctrine and the le-
gal culture” and unnecessarily complicates procedural matters.34 
Whether or not it is possible to create a single framework for defining 
jurisdiction,35 it is possible to eliminate unnecessary overlap by consciously 
avoiding it in the legislative and judicial lawmaking processes.  As a practi-
cal matter, there is no reason for Congress to define jurisdiction by anything 
related to the merits or equities of a case; nothing is gained by linking them 
and a great deal is lost.  Nor is there reason for the courts to affirmatively 
interpret Congress as having linked them.  Mindful legislative drafting and 
similarly mindful judicial analysis should achieve the necessary clean and 
clear line between this pair.  John R. Sand now gives Congress a new draft-
ing option.  It can make some merits rules “more absolute” without squeez-
ing those rules into the jurisdictional box.  This provides the systemic 
benefits of non-waivable requirements without muddying or over-
expanding the concept of jurisdiction and without forcing courts to adopt 
strained statutory readings. 
II. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 
Dodson’s recent work analyzes two timing provisions: the time for re-
moving cases to federal court and the time for filing a notice of appeal from 
the district court to the court of appeals.36  Timing rules straddle the juris-
diction/procedure line.  While jurisdictional rules define whether a court 
can exercise power to hear and resolve a case, procedural rules dictate how 
a court will do so.37  Timing rules might fit logically in either category. 
Dodson divides the concepts around three key normative concerns.  
The first is whether Congress has specifically designated a rule as jurisdic-
tional, with a presumption of jurisdictionality applied when Congress 
speaks in jurisdictional terms about the class of cases a court can hear.38  
The second looks to the function of a provision and whether it determines 
the power of the courts or whether it controls the behavior of the parties in 
litigation.39  This considers to whom a rule is directed: jurisdictional rules 
are directed at the court and its power, while procedural rules are directed to 
 
33  Lee, supra note 6, at 1614, 1627, 1629. 
34  Dane, supra note 6, at 47; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 662. 
35  Compare Dodson, supra note 1, at 66 with Lee, supra note 6, at 1629.  
36  Dodson, supra note 1, at 56, 58; Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 48 (2007), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2007/08/ 
jurisdictionali.html (link) [hereinafter Dodson, Jurisdictionality]. 
37  Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2364 (2007) (link); Dodson, supra note 1, at 59–60, 71; 
Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 44. 
38  Dodson, supra note 1, at 66; Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 43. 
39  Dodson, supra note 1, at 71. 
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the parties and their rights and obligations within litigation.40  Procedural 
rules go to the “fairness and efficiency of the truth-finding process,” ulti-
mately serving systemic values such as litigant autonomy, judicial effi-
ciency, and cost-effectiveness.41  The third concern looks to the effects and 
implications of characterizing a rule as one or the other.42  Dodson’s frame-
work is sound and consistent with my suggestions for the jurisdiction/merits 
pairing, particularly in its focus on the language of the applicable legal rule 
and whether it speaks to the court about its structural power or to the parties 
about how to behave within the litigation process. 
Unfortunately, the Court last term in Bowles v. Russell ignored 
Dodson’s framework—as well as any other meaningful framework.  In-
stead, it simply declared that the time requirement for filing a notice of ap-
peal was jurisdictional and thus not subject to any exception, even when the 
reason for the untimely filing was a party’s reliance on a judicial order that 
incorrectly stated the time for filing the appeal.43  The Court’s only explana-
tion was that the timing requirement appeared in a statute that was enacted 
by both houses of Congress and signed by the President, rather than in a 
court-promulgated rule.44  Dodson accurately criticizes Bowles in this space, 
taking the majority to task for failing to adopt any coherent guidelines be-
yond the distinction between statutory or rule sources.45  This is a meaning-
less justification because there is nothing inherently jurisdictional about a 
statute, particularly one that that neither speaks to the court nor mentions ju-
risdiction. 
Dodson is correct that the demarcation between jurisdiction and proce-
dure may be less urgent than between jurisdiction and merits, because the 
timing and manner of adjudicating issues does not diverge with this pair as 
it does with jurisdiction and merits.  Jurisdiction is one of several proce-
dural preliminaries that courts consider mainly at the outset of litigation, 
with the court acting as finder of fact for all of them.46  The only difference 
between them lies in the unique elements of jurisdiction—non-waivability 
and the independent judicial obligation to investigate.47  Jurisdictional rules 
also are generally understood to admit no equitable leniency or flexibility, 
an understanding Professor Dane labels an unfortunate mistake.48 
 
40  Id. 
41  John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 725 (1974); Dodson, supra 
note 1, at 71; Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46. 
42  Dodson, supra note 1, at 77. 
43  Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365 (2007). 
44  Id. at 2364–66; see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000) (link); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6). 
45  Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 45. 
46  See Dodson, supra note 1, at 69–70; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 649–50. 
47  Dodson, supra note 1, at 60. 
48  Dane, supra note 8, at 167–68. 
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But, just as the John R. Sand Court read a merits rule to possess juris-
dictional characteristics,49 Congress similarly could define a procedural rule 
to possess some or all jurisdictional characteristics and consequences.  
Dodson argues that the outcome in Bowles—that the time for filing an ap-
peal is not subject to equitable exception and thus that appeal was un-
timely—was correct.50  The timing rule could be understood as “mandatory 
but nonjurisdictional”; the rule governs the parties’ conduct in court and 
does not go to the basic structural values that define jurisdiction, but the 
court possesses no discretion to deviate from the rule on equitable 
grounds.51  As the Court did in John R. Sand, Dodson disaggregates the 
consequences of jurisdiction from the core definition of the term.  This pro-
duces the expected benefits of the rigidity that accompanies jurisdictional-
ity, when intended by the rule maker, “without doing violence to the nature 
of jurisdiction.”52  In fact, the discussion of Bowles in John R. Sand sug-
gests the Court has retroactively recast the earlier decision to make the ap-
peals-timing rule absolute for purposes of efficiency, but not necessarily 
jurisdictional.53 
Note that the middle road proposed by Dodson and implicitly approved 
of in John R. Sand may serve to further cloud the line between jurisdiction 
and procedure.  If Congress can assign a jurisdictional characteristic to a 
procedural rule, any practical distinctions between jurisdictional rules and 
procedural rules seems lost.  Nothing else defines the practical divide be-
tween these two strands, since the court serves as fact-finder for both issues. 
Characterizing a rule in this pair as one or the other thus must focus on the 
policies and values underlying the rule—structural values that define juris-
dictional rules as opposed to litigant- and efficiency-based values that de-
fine procedural rules.54  It also forces courts to find the formalist core of 
what it means for a rule to be “jurisdictional,” something the courts hereto-
fore have been reluctant to attempt.55 
Procedure and jurisdiction do align and divide over the question of 
congressional power over each.  On one hand, the extent of congressional 
control over federal-court jurisdiction has been an ongoing topic of textual, 
theoretical, and policy debate and dispute,56 with a number of commentators 
arguing that the text of Article III limits Congress’ ability to cut into the ju-
 
49  Supra notes 31–32.  
50  Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46. 
51  Id. at 46–47; but see Dane, supra note 8, at 164 (“[T]ime limits can also be jurisdictional without 
being interpreted literally and peremptorily . . . .”). 
52  Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46. 
53  Posting of Scott Dodson on Civil Procedure Prof. Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2008/01/dodson-three-mu.html (Jan. 8, 2008) (link). 
54  Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 36, at 46–47. 
55  Dane, supra note 8, at 175 (criticizing courts’ failure to “draw connections and to investigate the 
roots of legal ideas”); Dane, Jurisdictionality, supra note 6, at 135. 
56  Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 4, at 227–29, 269–71.  
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risdiction of the federal judiciary.57  On the other hand, there generally has 
been far less debate over congressional power over judicial procedure; 
courts and commentators long have accepted that Congress can dictate fed-
eral procedure through prospective rules, whether by delegating that power 
to the judiciary, as under the Rules Enabling Act, or by making procedural 
rules itself.58  Thus, faced with a congressionally enacted rule that somehow 
limits judicial power, its definition as jurisdictional or procedural may be 
essential to understanding the validity of the particular rule. 
III. PROCEDURE AND MERITS 
This pair has the longest history together.  The distinction between 
procedure and substance is famously at the federalist heart of the modern 
Erie-Hanna Doctrine, dictating the choice between federal and state law in 
diversity cases in federal court.59  Procedure focuses on rules going to the 
fairness and efficiency of the truth-finding process and substance goes to 
everything else.60  Courts apply a functional approach, looking to whether 
the policy underlying the rule “pertains to the operation of the federal 
courts” and is integrated into a system generally applicable to all civil ac-
tions and designed to achieve just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution.61 
The split is tenuous, given that procedural rules necessarily affect sub-
stantive results.62  But overlapping effects are not a problem; after all, the 
goal of modern federal procedure is to enable resolution of cases on their 
merits.63  The point is defining and understanding the two concepts, and 
here the Court arguably has drawn a “serviceable line between state ‘sub-
stantive’ law that binds federal courts and ‘procedural’ law governed by 
federal rules.”64 
 
57  Amar, supra note 28, at 1507–08; James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, 
and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 237–38 (2007) 
(link). 
58  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965) (link); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Poli-
tics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1681–82 (2004) [hereinafter 
Burbank, Procedure]; Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 24, at 1115–16.  But see Linda S. 
Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 382 (1992). 
59  Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (link); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 
Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent 
Job in its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 966 (1998). 
60  Ely, supra note 41, at 725.  
61  Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
281, 308. 
62  Burbank, Procedure, supra note 58, at 1710; Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legis-
lative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory 
of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 460 (2006) (link). 
63  FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986). 
64  Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 21), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009992 (link). 
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The procedure/merits line also rides on strong separation-of-powers 
concerns, dividing the respective lawmaking capacities of Congress and the 
courts.  The Rules Enabling Act delegates to the Supreme Court, and in turn 
to a standing advisory committee, power to make general rules of proce-
dure.65  It further prohibits the Court from making any rules that “abridge[], 
enlarge[] or modif[y] any substantive right.”66  Stephen Burbank grounds 
the latter limitation on allocation of federal rulemaking powers between 
Congress and the Court, with Congress delegating only control over proce-
dural rules, while retaining power to make substantive rules.67  Congress re-
serves to itself the power to make rules governing real-world, primary 
conduct and defining rights, duties, and obligations beyond the four walls of 
the courthouse, while the Supreme Court under the REA is limited only to 
making rules governing conduct within the four walls of the courthouse.68 
One example of the legislative/judicial divide and the problem of sepa-
ration of powers is the extent to which Congress can limit judicial enforce-
ment and remediation of federal constitutional rights.  Central to that debate 
is whether remedies properly are viewed as substantive, and thus tied to the 
merits, or as procedural. No one doubts congressional power to define 
remedies where it creates the underlying substantive right.69  And the con-
sensus is that Congress retains power to establish procedural rules through 
its ordinary legislative powers.70  But Congress cannot define the meaning 
of an underlying substantive constitutional right.71  Thus, the propriety of 
legislative limitations on judicial constitutional remedies depends on how 
we characterize remedies. 
On one end, John Harrison espouses the traditional view of remedies as 
procedural, subject to fairly plenary control through Congress’ structural 
legislative powers.72  Harrison argues that Congress takes the substantive 
legal rules, such as the meaning of constitutional provisions and rights, as 
given, then wields its structural authority to choose the means to implement 
and enforce those rights.73  Daryl Levinson labels this traditional view 
“rights essentialism.”  The constitutional right exists as the ideal, as an ul-
timate value judgment about what the Constitution means and what it pro-
tects; remedies—the rules for implementing constitutional rights and 
protecting against their future violation—exist in the realm of the concrete.  
The sharp distinction between rights and remedies produces a “division of 
 
65  28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a), 2073 (2000) (link). 
66  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (link). 
67  Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 24, at 1113. 
68  Id. at 1113–14. 
69  Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 
696 (2001) (link). 
70  Supra note 56–58.  
71  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (link). 
72  Harrison, supra note 7, at 2514. 
73  Id. at 2514–15. 
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institutional labor between courts and Congress,” under which courts are 
uniquely well-qualified to deal with idealized and abstract constitutional 
judgments about principles and values.  At the same time, however, courts 
should defer to Congress’ close legislative control over the process of ap-
plying those constitutional values and principles to the real world by defin-
ing expansive or narrow remedies.74 
On the other end is Tracy Thomas’s theory of the unified right, under 
which the remedy is “the intrinsic, operative component activating the de-
scriptive component of all unified substantive rights.”75  A unified right has 
both a descriptive component that sets forth a legal guarantee, duty, or 
moral assertion grounded in the Constitution, and a remedial component 
that imposes an active requirement as a consequence of a violation of the 
descriptive duty.  Rights and remedies are inseparable, the former meaning-
less without the latter.  The remedial power is derivative of the substantive 
power over the definitional right; the institutional actor that defines the core 
right has the power to dictate remedies for that right.76  Because Congress 
does not and cannot define the meaning of the descriptive constitutional 
right, it does not have the power to dictate corresponding constitutional 
remedies.77  Only the courts possess this power, as an aspect of defining the 
descriptive constitutional right. 
The procedure/merits corner also reveals that the long-standing aca-
demic obsession with “jurisdiction stripping” misses the larger point.  Re-
medial limitations, understood as procedural rules distinct from and 
collateral to substantive rights, arguably pose a greater threat to the ability 
of federal courts to vindicate substantive rights, than straight-forward strips 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.78 
But questions remain as to the degree to which Congress might engage 
in “procedure stripping”—using procedural rules and schemes to limit the 
most vigorous judicial enforcement of substantive rights.  For example, 
Congress often creates and entwines merits and procedure in a single statu-
tory scheme.  Consider the prohibitions on employment discrimination in 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Congress established real-world 
rights to be free from adverse employment action based on certain imper-
missible motivations (such as an employee’s race or sex) and imposed on 
employers a duty to refrain from discriminatory activities against employ-
ees.  Congress also tied these rights to a specific and detailed remedial pro-
cedural scheme requiring: prompt initial submission, in a narrow time 
 
74  Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 861, 
865–66 (1999). 
75  Thomas, supra note 69, at 694. 
76  Id. at 689, 696, 701–02. 
77  Id. at 704. 
78  Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of “Congress” to Attack the “Jurisdiction” of 
“Federal Courts,” 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1407–08 (2000). 
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frame, of claims to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for 
conciliation and non-adversarial resolution; exhaustion of non-litigation ef-
forts; and prompt internal reporting of claims prior to any official complaint 
and efforts at internal employer dispute resolution.79 
The result, according to Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman, is that 
Title VII often does not function as a meaningful “right-claiming scheme,” 
because compliance with the extensive right-specific procedural require-
ments effectively makes it difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to vindicate 
those rights.80  Scott Moss implicates the Court in this problem, arguing that 
it has acted to further two irreconcilable procedural policies—first, that 
plaintiffs should wait to initiate litigation in favor of internal, informal, non-
adversary, administrative resolution, and second, that plaintiffs should file 
immediately—to render Title VII incoherent and impossible to navigate.81  
It is the relatively rare plaintiff who can steer and clear these conflicting 
hurdles to gain meaningful access to the promised substantive rights.  The 
result is that the substantive protections purported to derive from the statute 
remain largely elusive and illusory. 
Martin Redish derives one potential limit on congressional procedure 
stripping from constitutional democratic theory.  In the name of democratic 
accountability, he argues, a legislature cannot deceive the public as to the 
state of their substantive primary rights, liberties, and duties by manipulat-
ing the attendant procedures.82  Accountability concerns prevent Congress 
from defining a general rule of real-world behavior—which the public be-
lieves entitles it to engage in some conduct or to be free from some conduct 
by others (such as discrimination in employment because of race or sex)—
while simultaneously imposing procedural hurdles that prevent courts from 
appropriately applying that rule, effectively transforming the nature of the 
substantive right.83  To do so is to engage in a “political shell game,” 
achieving substantive policy outcomes by hiding the true state of that policy 
from the public.84  This, in turn, undermines the public’s ability to judge 
representatives’ performance by their votes on normative social policy 
choices.85 
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If Grossman and Brake are correct that Title VII has failed as a source 
of substantive rights because those rights have been overwhelmed by its 
procedural scheme, perhaps Title VII becomes an example of the very po-
litical shell game that Redish condemns.  Certainly Redish’s argument sug-
gests some undefined limits on Congress’ ability to bury substantive rights 
within non-navigable procedural layers—at least without making it clear 
that it is doing so and that it intends to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Scott Dodson invited a conversation about the trichotomy of merits, ju-
risdiction, and procedure, and I hope this Essay serves as a workable open-
ing statement.  Whether we can formally disentangle the three concepts or 
each of the three pairs perhaps is a matter of dispute.  But by thinking in 
terms of the overlap and the interactions among them, perhaps we can re-
member how important it is to keep them separate from one another in the 
course of creating and applying legal rules.  And perhaps in time we might 
find a middle ground among the strands, in which they might share charac-
teristics and consequences while retaining distinct conceptual identities and 
definitions.  
 
 
 
